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Abstract
This paper studies singular mean field control problems and singular mean field
stochastic differential games. Both sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal
controls and for the Nash equilibrium are obtained. Under some assumptions the
optimality conditions for singular mean-field control are reduced to a reflected Skorohod
problem, whose solution is proved to exist uniquely. Some examples are given. In
particular, a simple singular mean-field game is studied where the Nash equilibrium
exists but is not unique.
1 Introduction
The irreversible investment problem is a classical problem in economics, with a long history.
In short, the problem is the following. A factory is facing an increased demand for its
product. Should it invest in more production capacity to meet the demand? The problem is
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that buying additional production capacity is an expensive, irreversible investment (usually
production equipment cannot easily be sold after use) and the future demand for the product
is uncertain. So the risk is that the factory ends up having paid for an additional capacity
it does not need. On the other hand, if the factory does not increase the capacity, it might
miss an opportunity for an increased sale.
This is a classical problem that has been studied by many authors in different contexts.
See e.g. Pindyck (1988, 1991, 1991),[16, 17, 18] , Kobila (1993) [8] and the references therein.
Mathematically the problem can be formulated as a singular control problem. In this paper
we study such singular control problems in the context of mean-field Itoˆ processes and under
model uncertainty. We interpret model uncertainty in the sense of Knight uncertainty, i.e.
uncertainty about the underlying probability measure. Using the Girsanov theorem for
Itoˆ processes we can parametrize the family of densities of possible underlying probability
measures by a stochastic process θ(t). This leads to a stochastic differential game in which
one of the players is the investor controlling the investment strategy and the other player
controls the model by choosing the model parameter θ. Since the investment is irreversible,
the control of the investor is a singular control, i.e. a non-decreasing non-negative stochastic
process ξ(t). Thus we are dealing with a singular mean-field stochastic differential game.
Recently, there have been several papers dealing with mean-field control problems. See
e.g. Meyer-Brandis et al (2012) [9], Anderson & Djehiche (2011) [1] and Hamade`ne (1998)
[5]. A recent paper dealing with mean-field singular control is L. Zhang (2012) [22]. Our
paper extends this paper in several directions: For example, we consider more general mean-
field operators. And we allow the profit rate f (see below) to depend on the state X , on the
mean-field term Y , and on the singular control ξ. We also allow both the coefficient λ in
the singular part of the state equation and the singular cost coefficient h in the performance
functional to depend on the state X . Moreover, we consider general games between two
players of such singular control problems with asymmetric information.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present three motivating examples, In
Section 3 we formulate the general mean-field singular stochastic control problem and prove
a sufficient maximum principle and a necessary maximum principle. In Section 4 we reduce
the maximum principle to a Skorohod problem and prove the existence and uniqueness of the
solution. In Section 5 we prove a sufficient maximum principle for general singular mean-field
stochastic games, and we obtain as a corollary a corresponding maximum principle for zero-
sum games. In Section 6 we apply the results above to an optimal harvesting problem of a
mean-field system and to model uncertainty singular control, in particular model uncertainty
irreversible investment type problems.
2
2 Three motivating examples
2.1 Optimal harvesting from a mean-field system
Suppose we model the size X0(t) of an unharvested population at time t by an equation of
the form
dX0(t) = E[X0(t)]b(t)dt +X0(t)σ(t)dB(t); t ∈ [0, T ]
X0(0) = x > 0. (2.1)
Here, and in the following, B(t) = B(t, ω) is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,F := {Ft}t≥0, P ) satisfying the usual conditions. P is a reference probability
measure. We assume that b(t) and σ(t) are given predictable processes. We may regard (2.1)
as a limit as n→∞ of a large population interacting system of the form
dxi,n(t) = [
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj,n(t)]b(t)dt + xi,n(t)σ(t)dBi(t), i = 1, 2, ..., n. (2.2)
Thus the mean-field term E[X(t)] represents an approximation to the weighted average
1
n
∑n
j=1 x
j,n(t) for large n. Now suppose we introduce harvesting of the population. The size
of the harvested population X(t) = Xξ(t) at time t can then be modeled by a mean-field
singular control stochastic differential equation of the form
dX(t) = E[X(t)]b(t)dt +X(t)σ(t)dB(t)− λ0(t)dξ(t); t ∈ [0, T ]
X(0) = x > 0 (2.3)
where ξ(t) is a non-decreasing predictable process with ξ(0−) = 0, representing the harvesting
effort, while λ0(t) > 0 is a given harvesting efficiency coefficient.
The performance functional is assumed to be of the form
J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
o
h0(t)X(t)dξ(t) +KX(T )
]
, (2.4)
where h0(t) is a given adapted price process and K = K(ω) is a given salvage price, assumed
to be FT -measurable. The problem is to find ξ
∗ such that
J(ξ∗) = sup
ξ
J(ξ) . (2.5)
Such a process ξ∗ is called an optimal singular control. This is an example of a mean-field
singular control problem. We will return to this problem in Section 6.1.
2.2 Optimal irreversible investments under model uncertainty
Let ξ(t) denote the production rate capacity of a production plant and let D(t) denote the
demand rate at time t. At any time t the production capacity can be increased by dξ(t)
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at the price λ0(t, D(t)) per capacity unit. The number of units sold per time unit is the
minimum of the demand D(t) and the capacity ξ(t).The total expected net profit of the
production is assumed to be
J(ξ, θ) =EQθ
[∫ T
0
a(t, E[ϕ(D(t))])min[D(t), ξ(t)]dt
+ g(D(T ))−
∫ T
0
λ0(t, D(t))dξ(t)
]
, (2.6)
where g(D(T )) is some salvage value of the closed-down production plant, ϕ is a given real
function and a(t, E[ϕ(D(t))]) is the unit sales price of the production. Here {Qθ}θ∈Θ is
a family of probability measures representing the model uncertainty. We let AG denote
the set of right-continuous, non-decreasing G-adapted processes ξ(·) with ξ(0−) = 0, where
G := {Gt}t≥0 is a given subfiltration of F, in the sense that Gt ⊆ Ft for all t. Heuristically, Gt
represents the information available to the investor at time t. We assume that the demand
D(t) is given by a jump diffusion of the form{
dD(t) = D(t−) [α(t, ω)dt+ β(t, ω)dB(t)] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T
D(0) > 0
(2.7)
where α(t, ω), β(t, ω) are given F-adapted processes. We want to maximize the expected
total net profit under the worst possible scenario, i.e. find (ξ∗, θ∗) ∈ AG ×Θ such that
sup
ξ∈AG
{
inf
θ∈Θ
J(ξ, θ)
}
= inf
θ∈Θ
{
sup
ξ∈AG
J(ξ, θ)
}
= J(ξ∗, θ∗). (2.8)
This is an example of a (partial information) singular control game of a jump diffusion.
Note that the system is non-Markovian, both because of the mean-field term and the partial
information constraint. See Sections 6.2-6.4.
2.3 A mean field singular game
Suppose the demand X(t) for a certain product at time t is given by a mean field SDE of
the form {
dX(t) = E[X(t)]b(t)dt +X(t)σ(t)dB(t)
X(0) = x > 0 .
There are two competing companies producing this product, with production rate capacities
represented by nondecreasing adapted processes ξ1, ξ2, respectively. The expected profit of
the company i is assumed to have to the form
Ji(ξ1, ξ2) = E
[∫ T
0
pi(t)min(X(t), ξ1(t) + ξ2(t))dt+
∫ T
0
hi(t)dξi(t)
]
,
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where pi(t) > 0 is the price per unit sold and hi(t) < 0 the production cost per unit for the
factory i, i = 1, 2. We want to find a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a pair (ξ∗1 , ξ
∗
2) ∈ A1 × A2 such
that
sup
ξ1∈A1
J1(ξ1, ξ
∗
2) = J1(ξ
∗
1, ξ
∗
2)
and
sup
ξ2∈A2
J2(ξ
∗
1 , ξ2) = J2(ξ
∗
1 , ξ
∗
2) ,
where Ai is the family of admissible controls ξi for company number i; i = 1, 2. We will
return to this problem in Section 6.5.
3 Maximum principle for singular mean field control
problems
3.1 Problem statement
We first recall some basic concepts and results from Banach space theory. Let V be an open
subset of a Banach space X with norm ‖ · ‖ and let F : V → R.
(i) We say that F has a directional derivative (or Gaˆteaux derivative) at x ∈ X in the
direction y ∈ X if
DyF (x) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
(F (x+ εy)− F (x))
exists.
(ii) We say that F is Fre´chet differentiable at x ∈ V if there exists a linear map L : X → R
such that
lim
h→0
h∈X
1
‖h‖
|F (x+ h)− F (x)− L(h)| = 0.
In this case we call L the gradient (or Fre´chet derivative) of F at x and we write
L = ∇xF.
(iii) If F is Fre´chet differentiable, then F has a directional derivative in all directions y ∈ X
and
DyF (x) = ∇xF (y) =: 〈∇xF, y〉.
In particular, if X = L2(P ) the Fre´chet derivative of F at X ∈ L2(P ), denoted by ∇XF ,
is a bounded linear functional on L2(P ), which we can identify with a random variable in
L2(P ). For example, if F (X) = E[ϕ(X)];X ∈ L2(P ), where ϕ is a real C1- function such
that ϕ(X) ∈ L2(P ) and ∂ϕ
∂x
(X) ∈ L2(P ), then ∇XF =
∂ϕ
∂x
(X) and ∇XF (Y ) = 〈
∂ϕ
∂x
(X), Y 〉 =
E[∂ϕ
∂x
(X)Y ] for Y ∈ L2(P ).
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Consider a mixed regular and singular controlled system with state process X(t) =
Xξ,u(t) of the form
dX(t) = b(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dt+ σ(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dB(t)
+ λ(t, X(t), u(t), ω)dξ(t), (3.1)
where
Y (t) = F (X(t, ·)) (3.2)
and F is a Fre´chet differentiable operator on L2(P ). We assume that all the coefficients
b, σ, λ, f, g and h are Fre´chet differentiable (C1) with respect to x, y, ξ, u with derivatives in
L2(m×P ), where m denoted Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Note that we allow the coefficients
to depend on both controls ξ and u. This might be relevant, for example, in harvesting
models. See (4.26). The performance functional is assumed to be of the form
J(ξ, u) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dt+ g(X(T ), Y (T ), ω)
+
∫ T
0
h(t, X(t), u(t), ω)ξ(dt)
]
. (3.3)
We may interpret the function f as a profit rate, g as a bequest or salvage value function
and h as a cost rate for the use of the singular control ξ.
We want to find (ξ∗, u∗) ∈ A such that
J(ξ∗, u∗) = sup
(ξ,u)∈A
J(ξ, u) . (3.4)
Here A is a given family of G-predictable processes such that the corresponding state equa-
tion has a unique solution X such that ω → X(t, ω) ∈ L2(P ) for all t. We let A denote the
set of possible values of u(t); t ∈ [0, T ] when (ξ, u) ∈ A.
3.2 A sufficient maximum principle for singular mean field control
In this subsection we prove a sufficient maximum principle for the singular control games
described above. To this end, define the Hamiltonians H as follows:
H(t, x, y, ξ, u, p, q)(dt, ξ(dt))
= H0(t, x, y, ξ, u, p, q)dt+ {λ(t, x, u)p+ h(t, x, u)}ξ(dt) , (3.5)
where
H0(t, x, y, w) = f(t, x, y, ξ, u) + b(t, x, y, ξ, u)p+ σ(t, x, y, ξ, u)q . (3.6)
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The associated mean-field BSDE for the adjoint processes is

dp(t) = −
∂H0
∂x
(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), p(t), q(t))dt
−
∂H0
∂y
(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), p(t), q(t))∇X(t)F )dt+ q(t)dB(t)
p(T ) =
∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T )) + E[
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))]∇X(T )F.
(3.7)
The sufficient maximum principle for this singular mean field control is stated as follows.
Theorem 3.1 (Sufficient maximum principle for mean-field singular control) Let ξˆ, uˆ ∈
A, with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t) of (3.1) and (3.7). Suppose the follow-
ing conditions hold
• The function
X, ξ, u→ H(t, X, F (X), ξ, u, pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) (3.8)
is concave with respect to (X, ξ, u) ∈ L2(P )× R× R for all t ∈ [0, T ].
• (The conditional maximum property)
ess sup
v∈A
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ(t), v, pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | Gt]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ(t), uˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | Gt] . (3.9)
• (Variational inequality)
ess sup
ξ
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξ, uˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | Gt]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ(t), uˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | Gt] (3.10)
Then (ξˆ(t), uˆ(t)) is an optimal control for J(ξ, u).
Proof. This theorem is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 5.1 below. We refer to
the proof there. 
3.3 A necessary maximum principle for singular mean field control
In the previous section we gave a verification theorem, stating that if a given control (ξˆ, uˆ)
satisfies (3.8)-(3.10), then it is indeed optimal for the singular mean field control problem. We
now establish a partial converse, implying that if a control (ξˆ, uˆ) is optimal for the singular
mean field control problem, then it is a conditional critical point for the Hamiltonian.
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To achieve this, we start with the setup of [12] as follows. For ξ ∈ A, let V(ξ) denote the
set of G-adapted processes η of finite variation such that there exists δ = δ(ξ) > 0 satisfying
ξ + aη ∈ A for all a ∈ [0, δ]. (3.11)
Then for ξ ∈ A and η ∈ V(ξ) we have, by our smoothness assumptions on the coefficients,
lim
a→0+
1
a
(J(ξ + aη)− J(ξ)) = E
[∫ T
0
{
∂f
∂x
(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t))Z(t)
+
∂f
∂y
(t, X(t)Y (t), ξ(t), u(t))〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
∂f
∂ξ
(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t))η(dt)
]
+ E
[
∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T ))Z(T ) +
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))〈∇X(T )F, Z(T )〉
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
{
∂h
∂x
(t, X(t), ξ(t), u(t))Z(t)ξ(dt) +
∫ T
0
h(t, X(t), ξ(t), u(t))η(dt)
]
(3.12)
where
Z(t) := lim
a→0+
1
a
(
X(ξ+aη)(t)−X(ξ)(t)
)
. (3.13)
Note that by the chain rule we have
lim
a→0+
1
a
(
Y (ξ+aη)(t)− Y (ξ)(t)
)
= lim
a→0+
1
a
(
F (
(
X(ξ+aη)(t))− F (X(ξ)(t)
))
= 〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉 .
(3.14)
Moreover,
dZ(t) =
(
∂b
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂b
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
)
dt
+
(
∂σ
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂σ
∂y
(t)〉∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
)
dB(t)
+
∂λ
∂x
(t)Z(t)ξ(dt) + λ(t)η(dt) ; Z(0) = 0 . (3.15)
Theorem 3.2 (Necessary maximum principle for singular mean-field control problem) Sup-
pose (ξˆ, uˆ) ∈ A is optimal, i.e. satisfies (3.4). Then
E
[
∂H0
∂u
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ(t), u, pˆ(t), qˆ(t))u=uˆ(t) | Gt
]
= 0 . (3.16)
8
Moreover, the following variational inequalities hold.

E
[
∂f
∂ξ
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ(t), uˆ(t)) + λ(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t))pˆ(t) + h(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t)) | Gt
]
≤ 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
E
[
∂f
∂ξ
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ(t), uˆ(t)) + λ(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t))pˆ(t) + h(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t)) | Gt
]
dξˆ(t) = 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ] .
(3.17)
Proof. To simplify the notation denote
fˆ(t) := f(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ(t))
λˆ(t) := λ(t, Xˆ(t)), hˆ(t) := h(t, Xˆ(t)).
We need to prove that if ξˆ ∈ AG is optimal, i.e. if
sup
ξ∈AG
J(ξ) = J(ξˆ) (3.18)
then ξˆ satisfies the following variational inequalities:
E
[
∂fˆ
∂ξ
(t) + λˆ(t)pˆ(t) + hˆ(t) | Gt
]
≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] (3.19)
and
E
[
∂fˆ
∂ξ
(t) + λˆ(t)pˆ(t) + hˆ(t) | Gt
]
ξˆ(dt) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.20)
To this end, choose ξ ∈ AG and η ∈ V(ξ) and compute
d
da
J(ξ + aη) |a=0= A1 + A2 + A3 + A4, (3.21)
where
A1 = E
[∫ T
0
{
∂f
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂f
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
}
dt
]
A2 = E
[∫ T
0
∂f
∂ξ
(t)η(dt)
]
A3 = E
[
∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T ))Z(T ) +
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))〈∇X(T )F, Z(T )〉
]
A4 = E
[∫ T
0
∂h
∂x
(t)Z(t)ξ(dt) + h(t)η(dt)
]
. (3.22)
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By the definition of H0 we have
A1 = E
[∫ t
0
Z(t)
{
∂H0
∂x
(t)−
∂b
∂x
(t)p(t)−
∂σ
∂x
(t)q(t)
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
(
∂H0
∂y
(t)−
∂b
∂y
(t)p(t)−
∂σ
∂y
(t)q(t)
)
dt
]
. (3.23)
By the terminal condition of p(T ) (see (3.7)) we have
A3 = E[〈p(T ), Z(T )〉]
= E
[∫ T
0
p(t)dZ(t) +
∫ T
0
Z(t)dp(t) +
∫ T
0
q(t)
(
∂σ
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂σ
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
)
dt
= E
[∫ T
0
p(t)
{
∂b
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂b
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
p(t)
∂λ
∂x
(t)Z(t)ξ(dt) +
∫ T
0
p(t)λ(t)η(dt)
−
∫ T
0
(
∂H0
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂H0
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
q(t)
(
∂σ
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂σ
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F, Z(t)〉
)
dt. (3.24)
Combining (3.21)-(3.24) we get
d
da
J(ξ + aη) |a=0= E
[∫ T
0
{
∂f
∂ξ
(s) + λ(s)p(s) + h(s)
}
η(ds)
]
.
In particular, if we apply this to an optimal ξ = ξˆ for J we get, for all η ∈ V(ξˆ),
E
[∫ T
0
{
∂fˆ
∂ξ
(s) + λˆ(t), pˆ(s) + hˆ(s)
}
η(ds)
]
=
d
da
J(ξˆ + aη)a=0 ≤ 0. (3.25)
If we choose η to be a pure jump process of the form
η(s) =
∑
0<ti≤s
α(t)
where α(t) > 0 is Gt-measurable, (3.25) gives
E
[(
∂fˆ
∂ξ
(t) + λˆ(t)pˆ(t) + hˆ(t)
)
α
]
≤ 0 for all t.
Since this holds for all such η, we conclude that
E
[
∂fˆ
∂ξ
(t) + λˆ(t)pˆ(t) + hˆ(t) | Gt
]
≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.26)
10
Finally, applying (3.25) to
η(dt) = ξˆ(dt) ∈ V(ξˆ)
and then to
η(dt) = −ξˆ(dt) ∈ V(ξˆ)
we get, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
E
[
∂fˆ
∂ξ
(t) + λˆ(t)pˆ(t) + hˆ(t) | Gt
]
ξˆ(dt) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.27)
With (3.26) and (3.27) the proof is complete. 
4 The optimality conditions
Since there have already been studies (see e.g. [9] and references therein) on the usual
(nonsingular) mean field control problems, let us consider only the singular control ξ, i.e.
with no regular control u. The system that we shall deal with, is described by
dX(t) = b(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ σ(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dB(t)
+λ(t, X(t), Y (t))dξ(t) . (4.1)
The performance functional is
J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ g(X(T ), Y (T )) +
∫ T
0
h(t, X(t), Y (t))dξ(t)
]
. (4.2)
The auxiliary backward stochastic differential equation with mean field is
dp(t) = −
[
fx(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + bx(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))p(t)
+σx(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))q(t)
]
dt−
[
fy(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))
+by(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))p(t) + σy(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))q(t)
]
∇X(t)Fdt
+q(t)dB(t) , (4.3)
p(T ) = gx(X(T ), Y (T )) + E [gy(X(T ), Y (T ))]∇X(T )F . (4.4)
To solve the above BSDE, we denote

α(t) = −bx(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))− by(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))∇X(t)F
β(t) = −σx(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))− σy(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))∇X(t)F
φ(t) = −fx(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))− fy(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))∇X(t)F
Θ = gx(X(T ), Y (T )) + E [gy(X(T ), Y (T ))]∇X(T )F .
(4.5)
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We also denote
ρt,T := exp
{∫ T
t
β(s)dWs +
∫ T
t
[
α(s)ds−
1
2
β2(s)
]
ds
}
.
Then application of Equation (2.11) of [7] to the above backward SDE yields
p(t) = E
(
Θρt,T +
∫ T
t
ρt,rφ(r)dr
∣∣Ft
)
. (4.6)
Substituting this into the maximum principle equations (3.17), we see that the maximum
principle consists of the following equations:
∂f
∂ξ
(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + λ(t, X(t), Y (t))p(t) + h(t, X(t), Y (t)) ≤ 0 (4.7)
and [
∂φ
∂ξ
(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + λ(t, X(t), Y (t))p(t) + h(t, X(t), Y (t))
]
dξ(t) = 0 . (4.8)
Thus here is the strategy to solve the maximum principle equations (4.1), (4.7) and (4.8),
where the p(t) in (4.7) and (4.8) is given by (4.6): First, assuming that X is known, we solve
the backward stochastic differential equation (4.3) with the terminal condition (4.4) to obtain
(4.6). Then substitute it into (4.7). This way we obtain an equation which will describe the
domain D in which the process X(t) must be all the time. We control the process X(t) in
such a way that when the process is in the interior of the domain D, we don’t do anything.
When the process reaches the boundary of D, we exercise the minimal push to keep the
process inside the domain D. Here are some detailed explanation of the above strategy:
The equations (4.7) and (4.8) are essentially an equation for the “domain” of the state
X(t) and the condition for the singular control ξ to satisfy. The equation (4.7) can be
complicated since the solution p(t) may depend on the paths of X , Y and the path of
control ξ itself up to time t. Denote Xt = (X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t) the trajectory of X up to time
t. Then p(t) can be represented in general as p(t) = p(X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)).
We now consider a slightly more general situation, where the singular control may be
any finite variation process, not necessarily increasing. The increasing case corresponds to
r(t, Xt, Yt, ξt) =∞ below.
Suppose that there are two functionals l, r : [0, T ] × C([0, T ],R)3 → R with l ≤ r such
that the equations (4.7) and (4.8) can be written as


l(t, Xt, Yt, ξt) ≤ X(t) ≤ r(t, Xt, Yt, ξt)
∫ T
0
[X(t)− l(t, Xt, Yt, ξt)] dξ(t) = 0
∫ T
0
[r(t, Xt, Yt, ξt)−X(t)] dξ(t) = 0 .
(4.9)
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Then we are led to the problem of finding a finite variation (not necessarily increasing)
control ξ for the system
dX(t) = b(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ σ(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dB(t)
+λ(t, X(t), Y (t))dξ(t) (4.10)
satisfying (4.9). This is a Skorohod type problem. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to
the case when
λ(t, x, y) = 1 .
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that the following hold
1. b and σ are uniformly Lipschitz continuous. Namely, there is a positive constant L
such that
|b(t, x2, y2, ξ2)− b(t, x1, y1, ξ1)| ≤ L(|x2 − x1|+ |y2 − y1|+ |ξ2 − ξ1|) . (4.11)
The same inequality holds for σ.
2. l and r are uniformly Lipschitz continuous, i.e.
|r(t, X2t , Y
2
t , ξ
2
t )− r(t, X
1
t , Y
1
t , ξ
1
t )| ≤ κ sup
0≤s≤t
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|+ |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|
]
+ L
∫ t
0
sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s) + |Y 2(s)− Y 1(s)|+ |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|
]
dr (4.12)
for some κ < 1/4. The same inequality holds for l.
3. For any t ∈ [0, T ], X, Y and ξ in C([0, T ] ,R),
l(t, Xt, Yt, ξt) < r(t, Xt, Yt, ξt) . (4.13)
Then, Equations (4.9)-(4.10) have a unique solution.
Proof. We shall apply the Banach fixed point theorem to prove the theorem. Let us
denote by B the Banach space of all continuous adapted processes (X(t), ξ(t)) which are
square integrable. More precisely,
B =
{
(X, ξ) , X and ξ are continuous and adapted and
‖(X, ξ)‖B :=
{
E sup
0≤t≤T
(
|X(t)|2 + |ξ(t)|2
)}1/2
<∞
}
.
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From (4.9) and (4.10), we define the following mapping on B:
F (X, ξ) = (Z, η) : (4.14)
where (Z, η) satisfies the inequalities:

l(t, Xt, Yt, ξt) ≤ Z(t) ≤ r(t, Xt, Yt, ξt)
∫ T
0
[X(t)− l(t, Xt, Yt, ξt)] dη(t) = 0
∫ T
0
[r(t, Xt, Yt, ξt)−X(t)] dη(t) = 0 ,
(4.15)
and, in addition,
dZ(t) = b(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ σ(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dB(t) + dη(t) (4.16)
For every given continuous pair (X(t), ξ(t)) in B, by the condition (3), Theorem 2.6 and
Corollary 2.4 of [3] the above Skorohod problem has a unique solution (Z(t), η(t)) and the
solution pair (Z(t), η(t)) can be represented as
η(t) = Ξ(l, r, ψ)(t) (4.17)
Z(t) = ψ(t)− η(t) , (4.18)
where
ψ(t) :=
∫ t
0
b(s,X(s), Y (s), ξ(s))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,X(s), Y (s), ξ(s))dB(s)
l(u) := l(u,Xu, Yu, ξu)
r(u) := r(u,Xu, Yu, ξu)
Ξ(l, r, ψ)(t) := max
{[
(ψ(0)− r(0))+ ∧ inf
u∈[0,t]
(ψ(u)− l(u))
]
,
sup
s∈[0,t]
[
(ψ(s)− r(s)) ∧ inf
u∈[s,t]
(ψ(u)− l(u))
]}
.
It is elementary that
|max{b1, b2} −max{a1, a2}| ≤ max{b1 − a1, b2 − a2}∣∣∣∣ sup
0≤t≤T
g(t)− sup
0≤t≤T
f(t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
0≤t≤T
|g(t)− f(t)|∣∣∣∣ inf0≤t≤T g(t)− inf0≤t≤T f(t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
0≤t≤T
|g(t)− f(t)| .
From the expression of Ξ, we easily see that
sup
0≤s≤t
|Ξ(l2, r2, ψ2)(s)− Ξ(l1, r1, ψ1)(s)| ≤2 sup
0≤s≤t
[|l2(s)− l1(s)|+ |r2(s)− r1(s)|]
+ 4 sup
0≤s≤t
[|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|] . (4.19)
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Now we want to show that B ∋ (X, ξ)→ F (X, ξ) = (Z, η) is a contraction on B. Assume that
(X1, ξ1) and (X2, ξ2) be two elements in B and let (Z1, η1) and (Z2, η2) be the corresponding
solutions to (4.15)-(4.16). Then for i = 1, 2, we have
ηi(t) = Ξ(li, ri, ψi)(t) (4.20)
Zi(t) = ψi(t)− ηi(t) , (4.21)
where
ψi(t) :=
∫ t
0
b(s,X i(s), Y i(s), ξi(s))ds+
∫ t
0
σi(s,X
i(s), Y i(s), ξi(s))dB(s)
li(u) := l(u,X
i
u, Y
i
u , ξ
i
u)
ri(u) := r(u,X
i
u, Y
i
u , ξ
i
u)
ηi := Ξ(li, ri, ψi)(t) = max
{[
(ψi(0)− ri(0))
+ ∧ inf
u∈[0,t]
(ψi(u)− li(u))
]
,
sup
s∈[0,t]
[
(ψi(s)− ri(s)) ∧ inf
u∈[s,t]
(ψi(u)− li(u))
]}
.
From (4.19) and then from the assumptions on l and r, we see that
E sup
0≤r≤t
|η2(r)− η1(r)|
2
≤ 8E sup
0≤s≤t
[
|l2(s)− l1(s)|
2 + |r2(s)− r1(s)|
2
]
+ 32E sup
0≤s≤t
[
|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|
2
]
≤ 8κ2E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
+32E sup
0≤s≤t
|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|
2
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
dr .
By standard argument from stochastic analysis, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|
2 ≤ C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr .
Thus we have
E sup
0≤r≤t
|η2(r)− η1(r)|
2 ≤ 8E sup
0≤s≤t
[
|l2(s)− l1(s)|
2 + |r2(s)− r1(s)|
2
]
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr .
(4.22)
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From (4.21) we have
E sup
0≤r≤t
|Z2(r)− Z1(r)|
2 ≤ 2E sup
0≤r≤t
|η2(r)− η1(r)|
2 + 2E sup
0≤r≤t
|ψ2(r)− ψ1(r)|
2
≤ 16κ2E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
+64E sup
0≤s≤t
|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|
2
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr
≤ 16κ2E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr .
Combining the above inequality with (4.22), we have
E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|Z2(r)− Z1(r)|
2 + |η2(r)− η1(r)|
2
]
≤ 16κ2E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr
≤ (16κ2 + Ct)E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
. (4.23)
If κ < 1/4, then we can choose t0 such that 16κ
2 + Ct < 1 for all t ≤ t0. Thus from (4.23),
we conclude that F is a contraction mapping from B to B. Following a routine argument,
we see that the solution ξ(t), X(t) for the equations (4.9) and (4.10) up to time t0. Since the
constant C in 16κ2+Ct does not depends on the initial condition, we repeat this procedure
to solve the equations (4.9) and (4.10) for on the interval [0, T ]. 
Remark 4.2 From the proof of the theorem, we see that if we define the Picard iteration for
n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 

l(t, X
(n)
t , Y
(n)
t , ξ
(n)
t ) ≤ X
(n+1)(t) ≤ r(t, X
(n)
t , Y
(n)
t , ξ
(n)
t )
∫ T
0
[
X(n)(t)− l(t, X
(n)
t , Y
(n)
t , ξ
(n)
t )
]
dξ(n+1)(t) = 0
∫ T
0
[
r(t, X
(n)
t , Y
(n)
t , ξ
(n)
t )−X
(n)(t)
]
dξ(n+1)(t) = 0 ,
(4.24)
and
dX(n+1)(t) = b(t, X(n)(t), Y (n)(t), ξ(n)(t))dt (4.25)
+σ(t, X(n)(t), Y (n)(t), ξ(n)(t))dB(t) + dξ(n+1)(t) ,
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where X
(0)
t = X(0), ξ
(0)
t = 0, then (X
(n)(t), ξ(n)(t)) will converge to the true solution
(X(t), ξ(t)) in B. This may be used to construct the numerical solutions.
Example 4.3 Let us consider an optimal harvesting problem where the population density
X(t) at time t is described by the linear controlled system
dX(t) = [b0(t, ξ) + b1(t)X(t) + b2(t)EX(t)] dt
+σ(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dB(t)− dξ(t) . (4.26)
We allow the coefficients b0 and σ0 to depend on the harvested amount ξ to model the
situation where the harvesting has influence on the environment and hence on the population
growth. We want to find ξˆ such that
sup
ξ∈A
J(ξ) = J(ξˆ) , (4.27)
where
J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ g(X(T ), Y (T )) +
∫ T
0
h(t, X(t))ξ(dt)
]
,
with
f(t, x, y, ξ) = f1(t)x+ f2(t)y + f3(t, ξ) (4.28)
and
g(x, y) = Kx (4.29)
with K > 0. Then from (4.5) we get

α(t) = −b1(t)− b2(t)
β(t) = −σx(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))− σy(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))∇X(t)F
φ(t) = −f1(t)− f2(t)
Θ = K .
Denote
ρt,T = exp
{∫ T
t
β(s)dWs +
∫ T
t
[
α(s)ds−
1
2
β2(s)
]
ds
}
.
Since α is deterministic, we have for all t ≤ r ≤ T ,
α(t, r) := E
(
ρt,r
∣∣Ft)
= exp
{∫ r
t
α(s)ds
}
E
(
exp
{∫ r
t
β(s)dWs −
1
2
∫ r
t
β2(s)ds
} ∣∣Ft
)
= exp
{∫ r
t
α(s)ds
}
.
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Note that α(t, r) is a deterministic function. It is easy to see from (4.6) that
p(t) = Kα(t, T ) +
∫ T
t
α(t, r)φ(r)dr (4.30)
is a deterministic function. Thus we have
∂
∂ξ
f3(t, ξ) + λ(t, X(t), Y (t))p(t) + h(t, X(t), Y (t)) ≤ 0 .
[
∂
∂ξ
f3(t, ξ) + λ(t, X(t), Y (t))p(t) + h(t, X(t), Y (t))
]
dξ(t) = 0 .
If furthermore we assume
φ(t) ≥ 0 ,
∂
∂ξ
f3(t, ξ) = 0 , and h(t, x, y) = h0(t)x
κ , (4.31)
where h0(t) is positive and κ is a constant, we get (noting that λ(t) = −1)
−p(t) + h0(t)X
κ(t) ≤ 0 ,
or
X(t)


≤
(
p(t)
h0(t)
) 1
κ
if κ > 0
≥
(
h0(t)
p(t)
)− 1
κ
if κ < 0 .
In this case, we can take

l(t, x, y, ξ) = 0 and r(t, x, y, ξ) =
(
p(t)
h0(t)
) 1
κ
if κ > 0
l(t, x, y, ξ) =
(
h0(t)
p(t)
)− 1
κ
and r(t, x, y, ξ) =∞ if κ < 0 .
(4.32)
Note that κ < 0 means that unit price goes up when the population goes down (which
becomes more precious). In this case, we want keep the population above a threshold h¯(t) =(
h0(t)
p(t)
)− 1
κ
. It is interesting to note that when h0(t) is larger, this threshold h¯0(t) is also
larger. We have proved
Theorem 4.4 Under the assumptions (4.28), (4.29) and (4.31), the solution ξˆ of the mean
field singular control problem (4.27) is given by the solution (Xˆ, Yˆ , ξˆ) of the Skorohod reflec-
tion problem (4.9) and (4.26), with the boundaries l and r given by (4.32).
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Next, we continue the above example but with h being given by
h(t, x, y) := h0(t)x
2 + h1(t)x . (4.33)
Namely, we continue to assume (4.26)-(4.30). But we replace (4.31) by
φ(t) ≥ 0 ,
∂
∂ξ
f3(t, ξ) = 0 , and h(t, x, y) = h0(t)x
2 + h1(t)x . (4.34)
where h0(t) is positive. Then, the inequalities (4.7) - (4.8) become
−p(t) + h0(t)X
2(t) + h1(t)X(t) ≤ 0 .
l(t) ≤ X(t) ≤ r(t) , (4.35)
where
l(t) :=
h1(t)−
√
h21(t) + 4h0(t)p(t)
2h0(t)
(4.36)
r(t) :=
h1(t) +
√
h21(t) + 4h0(t)p(t)
2h0(t)
. (4.37)
Similar to Theorem 4.4, we have
Theorem 4.5 Under the assumptions (4.28), (4.29) and (4.34), the solution ξˆ of the mean
field singular control problem (4.27) is given by the solution (Xˆ, Yˆ , ξˆ) of the Skorohod reflec-
tion problem (4.9) and (4.26), with the boundaries l and r given by (4.35)-(4.37).
We can also consider the case that h is given by (4.33) but with h0(t) < 0. In this case, the
domain (4.7) will be either
X(t) ≤ h(t) or X(t) ≥ h¯(t) .
The interested readers may write down similar result for this case as well.
5 General singular mean-field games
5.1 Statement of the problem
In this section we consider the stochastic game of two players, each of them is to maximize
his/her singular mean-field performance.
Denote ξ = (ξ1, ξ2), u = (u1, u2), w = (w1, w2), λ = (λ1, λ2), h = (h1, h2) with hi =
(hi,1, hi,2), and let the pair wi = (ξi, ui) represent the control of player i ; i = 1, 2.
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Suppose the process X(t) = Xξ,u(t) under control of the two players satisfy the following
stochastic differential equation with jumps.
dX(t) = b(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dt+ σ(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dB(t)
+ λ(t, X(t), u(t), ω)dξ(t), (5.1)
where
Y (t) = F (X(t, ·)), (5.2)
and F is a Fre´chet differentiable operator on L2(P ).
We put Gi = {Git}t≥0 where G
i
t ⊆ Ft is the information available to player i at time t.The
performance functional for player i is assumed to be on the form
Ji(ξ, u) = E
[∫ T
0
fi(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), ω)dt+ gi(X(T ), Y (T ), ω)
+
∫ T
0
hi(t, X(t), u(t), ω)ξ(dt)
]
; i = 1, 2. (5.3)
We want to find a Nash equilibrium for this game, i.e. find (ξ∗1 , u
∗
1) ∈ A
(1) and (ξ∗2, u
∗
2) ∈
A(2) such that
sup
(ξ1,u1)∈A(1)
J1(ξ1, u1, ξ
∗
2 , u
∗
2) = J1(ξ
∗
1 , u
∗
1, ξ
∗
2 , u
∗
2) (5.4)
and
sup
(ξ2,u2)∈A(2)
J2(ξ
∗
1, u
∗
1, ξ2, u2) = J2(ξ
∗
1 , u
∗
1, ξ
∗
2 , u
∗
2) (5.5)
Here A(i) is a given family of G(i)-predictable processes such that the corresponding state
equation has a unique solution X such that ω → X(t, ω) ∈ L2(P ) for all t. We let A(i)
denote the set of possible values of ui(t); t ∈ [0, T ] when (ξi, ui) ∈ A
(i); i = 1, 2.
5.2 A sufficient maximum principle for the general non-zero sum
case
Define two Hamiltonians Hi; i = 1, 2, as follows:
Hi(t, x, y, ξ1, u1, ξ2, u2, pi, qi)(dt, ξ1(dt), ξ2(dt))
= Hi,0(t, x, y, ξ1, u1, ξ2, u2, pi, qi)dt+
2∑
j=1
{λj(t, x, u)pi + hi,j(t, x, u)}ξj(dt) (5.6)
where
Hi,0(t, x, y, w, pi, qi) := fi(t, x, y, w) + b(t, x, y, ξ, u)pi + σ(t, x, y, ξ, u)qi. (5.7)
We assume that for i = 1, 2, H = Hi is Fre´chet differentiable (C
1) in the variables x, y, ξ, u.
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The BSDE for the adjoint processes pi, qi is

dpi(t) = −
∂Hi,0
∂x
(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), pi(t), qi(t))dt
−
∂Hi,0
∂y
(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), pi(t), qi(t))∇X(t)F )dt
+qi(t)dB(t)
pi(T ) =
∂gi
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T )) +
∂gi
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))∇X(T )F ; i = 1, 2.
(5.8)
Note that (5.8) is an operator valued BSDE for each ω.
Theorem 5.1 (Sufficient maximum principle) Let (ξˆ1, uˆ1) ∈ A
(1), (ξˆ2, uˆ2) ∈ A
(2) with
corresponding solutions Xˆ, pˆi, qˆi, rˆi of (2.3) and (2.8). Assume the following:
• The maps
X,w1 → H1(t, X, F (X), w1, wˆ2(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t)), (5.9)
and
X,w2 → H2(t, X, F (X), wˆ1, w2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t)), (5.10)
and
X → gi(X,F (X)) (5.11)
are concave for all t; i = 1, 2.
• (The conditional maximum properties)
ess sup
u1∈A1
E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), u1, ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t)) | G
(1)
t ]
= E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t)) | G
(1)
t ] (5.12)
and
ess sup
u2∈A2
E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), u2, pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t)) | G
(2)
t ]
= E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t)) | G
(2)
t ], (5.13)
• (Variational inequalities)
ess sup
ξ1
E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξ1, uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t)) | G
(1)
t ]
= E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t)) | G
(1)
t ] (5.14)
and
ess sup
ξ2
E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξ2, uˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t)) | G
(2)
t ]
= E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t)) | G
(2)
t ], (5.15)
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Then (ξˆ1, uˆ1), (ξˆ2, uˆ2) is a Nash equilibrium, in the sense that (5.4) and (5.5) hold with
ξ∗i := ξˆi, u
∗
i := uˆi; i = 1, 2.
Proof. By introducing a suitable increasing sequence of stopping times converging to T ,
we see that we may assume that all local martingales appearing in the proof below are mar-
tingales. We refer to [15] for details. We first study the stochastic control problem (5.4). For
simplicity of notation, in the following we put X(t) = Xξ1,u1,ξˆ2,uˆ2(t), Y (t) = Y ξ1,u1,ξˆ2,uˆ2(t) and
Xˆ(t) = X ξˆ1,uˆ1,ξˆ2,uˆ2(t), Yˆ (t) = Y ξˆ1,uˆ1,ξˆ2,uˆ2(t), b(t) = b(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ1(t), ξ2(t), u1(t), u2(t), ω), bˆ(t) =
b(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξ1(t), ξˆ2(t), u1(t), uˆ2(t), ω) and similarly with σ(t), σˆ(t).
Consider J1(ξ1, u1, ξˆ2, uˆ2)− J1(ξˆ1, uˆ1, ξˆ2, uˆ2) = I1 + I2 + I3 + I4, where
I1 := E
[∫ T
0
{f1(t, X(t), Y (t), w1(t), wˆ2(t))− f1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), wˆ1(t), wˆ2(t))}dt
]
I2 := E[g1(X(T ), Y (T ))− g1(Xˆ(T ), Yˆ (T ))]
I3 := E
[∫ T
0
{h1(t, X(t), u1(t), uˆ2(t))dξ1(t)− h1,1(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t))dξˆ1(t)}
]
I4 := E
[∫ T
0
{h2(t, X(t), u1(t), uˆ2(t))dξ2(t)− h1,2(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t))dξˆ2(t)}
]
By the definition of H1 we have
I1 = E[
∫ T
0
{H1,0(t, Xt, Yt, w1(t), wˆ2(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t))
−H1,0(t, Xˆt, Yˆt, wˆ(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t))− (b− bˆ)pˆ1 − (σ − σˆ)qˆ1}dt] (5.16)
By concavity of g1 and the Itoˆ formula we have
I2 ≤ E
[
∂g1
∂x
(Xˆ(T ), Yˆ (T )))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))
+
∂g1
∂y
(Xˆ(T ), Yˆ (T ))〈∇Xˆ(T )F,X(T )− Xˆ(T )〉
]
=< pˆ1(T ), X(T )− Xˆ(T ) >
= E
[∫ T
0
pˆ1(t)dX˜(t) +
∫ T
0
X˜(t)dpˆ1(t) +
∫ T
0
qˆ1(t)σ˜(t)dt
]
, (5.17)
where we have put
X˜(t) := X(t)− Xˆ(t), σ˜(t) := σ(t)− σˆ(t). (5.18)
Note that
E
[∫ T
0
pˆ1(t)dX˜(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
pˆ1(t)(b− bˆ)dt
+
∫ T
0
pˆ1(t)(λ1dξ1(t)− λˆ1dξˆ1(t) + λ2dξˆ2(t)− λˆ2dξˆ2(t))
]
. (5.19)
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and that
E
[∫ T
0
X˜(t)dpˆ1(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
X˜(t){−
∂H1,0
∂x
(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t))
−
∂H1,0
∂y
(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t))∇X(t)F}dt
]
(5.20)
Combining (5.20) with I3 and I4 we get
J1(ξ1, u1, ξˆ2, uˆ2)− J1(ξˆ1, uˆ1, ξˆ2, uˆ2)
≤ E
[∫ T
0
{H1(t)− Hˆ1(t)−
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(X − Xˆ)−
∂Hˆ1
∂y
∇F (X − Xˆ)}dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
E[H1(t)− Hˆ1(t)−
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(X − Xˆ)−
∂Hˆ1
∂y
∇F (X − Xˆ) | G
(1)
t ]dt
]
(5.21)
where Hˆ1(t) means that H1 is evaluated at (t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ(t), uˆ(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t)), while H1(t)
means that H1 is evaluated at (t, X(t), Y (t), ξ1(t), u1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t)).
Note that by concavity of H1 we have
H1(t, X, F (X), ξ1, u1, ξˆ2, uˆ2, pˆ1, qˆ1)−H1(t, Xˆ, F (Xˆ), ξˆ1, uˆ1, ξˆ2, uˆ2, pˆ1, qˆ1)
≤
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(Xˆ)(X − Xˆ) +
∂Hˆ1
∂y
(Xˆ)∇XˆF (X − Xˆ) +∇ξ1Hˆ1(ξˆ)(ξ1 − ξˆ1) +
∂Hˆ1
∂u1
(uˆ)(u1 − uˆ1)
(5.22)
Therefore, to obtain that J1 − Jˆ1 ≤ 0, it suffices that
E[∇ξ1Hˆ1(ξˆ) | G
(1)
t ](ξ1 − ξˆ1) ≤ 0 (5.23)
for all ξ1, and that
E[
∂Hˆ1
∂u1
(uˆ) | G
(1)
t ](u1 − uˆ1) ≤ 0 (5.24)
for all u1. The inequality (5.24) holds by our assumption (5.12), and the inequality (5.23)
holds by our assumption (5.14). The difference
J2(ξˆ1, uˆ1, ξ2, u2)− J2(ξˆ1, uˆ1, ξˆ2, uˆ2)
is handled similarly. 
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5.3 The zero-sum game case
In the zero-sum case we have
J1(w1, w2) + J2(w1, w2) = 0. (5.25)
Then the Nash equilibrium (wˆ1, wˆ2) ∈ A1×A2 satisfying (5.4)-(5.5) becomes a saddle point
for
J(w1, w2) := J1(w1, w2). (5.26)
To see this, note that (5.4)-(5.5) imply that
J1(w1, wˆ2) ≤ J1(wˆ1, wˆ2) = −J2(wˆ1, wˆ2) ≤ −J2(wˆ1, w2)
and hence
J(w1, wˆ2) ≤ J(wˆ1, wˆ2) ≤ J(wˆ1, w2) for all w1, w2.
From this we deduce that
inf
w2∈A2
sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, w2) ≤ sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, wˆ2) ≤ J(wˆ1, wˆ2)
≤ inf
w2∈A2
J(wˆ1, w2) ≤ sup
w1∈A1
inf
w2∈A2
J(w1, w2). (5.27)
Since we always have inf sup ≥ sup inf, we conclude that
inf
w2∈A2
sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, w2) = sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, wˆ2) = J(wˆ1, wˆ2)
= inf
w2∈A2
J(wˆ1, w2) = sup
w1∈A1
inf
w2∈A2
J(w1, w2). (5.28)
i.e. (wˆ1, wˆ2) ∈ A1 ×A2 is a saddle point for J(w1, w2).
Hence we want to find (ξ∗, θ∗) ∈ AE ×Θ such that
sup
ξ∈AE
{
inf
θ∈Θ
J(ξ, θ)
}
= inf
θ∈Θ
{
sup
ξ∈AE
J(ξ, θ)
}
= J(ξ∗, θ∗), (5.29)
where
J(ξ, u) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), ω)dt+ g(X(T ), Y (T ), ω)
+
∫ T
0
h(t, X(t), u(t), ω)ξ(dt)
]
. (5.30)
As shown in [13], in this case only one Hamiltonian H is needed, namely
H(t, x, y, ξ1, u1, ξ2, u2, p, q)(dt, ξ1(dt), ξ2(dt))
= H0(t, x, y, ξ1, u1, ξ2, u2, p, q)dt+
2∑
j=1
{λj(t, x, u)p+ hj(t, x, u)}ξj(dt) (5.31)
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where
H0 := H1,0(t, x, y, w, p, q)
= f(t, x, y, w) + b(t, x, y, u)p+ σ(t, x, y, u)q (5.32)
and we have put gi = g, hi = h1,i ; i = 1, 2 and f1 = f = −f2.
Moreover, there is only one couple (p, q) of adjoint processes, given by the BSDE

dp(t) = −
∂H0
∂x
(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), p(t), q(t))dt
−
∂H0
∂y
(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), p(t), q(t))∇X(t)F )dt
+q(t)dB(t)
p(T ) =
∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T )) + E[
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))]∇X(T )F.
(5.33)
We can now state the corresponding sufficient maximum principle for the zero-sum game:
Theorem 5.2 (Sufficient maximum principle for zero-sum singular mean-field games)
Let (wˆ1, wˆ2) ∈ A1 × A2, with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t). Suppose the fol-
lowing holds
• The function
X,w1 → H(t, X, F (X), w1, wˆ2(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) (5.34)
is concave for all t, the function
X,w2 → H(t, X, F (X), wˆ1(t), w2, pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) (5.35)
is convex for all t, and the function
X → g(X,F (X)) (5.36)
is affine.
• (The conditional maximum property)
ess sup
v1∈A1
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), v1, ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | G
(1)
t ]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | G
(1)
t ] (5.37)
and
ess inf
v2∈A2
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), v2, pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | G
(2)
t ]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | G
(2)
t ]. (5.38)
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• (Variational inequalities)
ess sup
ξ1
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξ1, uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | G
(1)
t ]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | G
(1)
t ] (5.39)
and
ess inf
ξ2
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξ2, uˆ2(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | G
(2)
t ]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) | G
(2)
t ]. (5.40)
Then uˆ(t) = (uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t)) is a saddle point for J(u1, u2).
Proof. The proof is similar to (and simpler than) the proof of Theorem 5.1 and is omitted.

5.4 A necessary maximum principle for the general case
In Section 6.2 we proved a verification theorem, stating that if a given control (ξˆ, uˆ) satisfies
certain conditions, then it is indeed optimal for the singular control game. We now establish
a partial converse, implying that it a control (ξˆ, uˆ) is optimal for the singular control game,
then it is a conditional saddle point for the Hamiltonian.
Theorem 5.3 (Necessary maximum principle for singular mean-field games)
Suppose wˆ1 = (ξˆ1, uˆi) ∈ A
(1) and wˆ2 = (ξˆ2, uˆ2) ∈ A
(2) constitute a Nash equilibrium for
the game, i.e. satisfies (5.4) and (5.5). Then
E
[
∂H1,0
∂u1
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), u1, ξˆ2(t), uˆ2(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t))u1=uˆ1(t) | G
(1)
t
]
= 0 (5.41)
and
E
[
∂H2,0
∂u2
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), ξˆ1(t), uˆ1(t), ξˆ2(t), u2, pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t))u2=uˆ2(t) | G
(2)
t
]
= 0. (5.42)
Moreover, the following variational inequalities hold:

E
[
∂fi
∂ξi
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), wˆ(t)) + λi(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t))pˆi(t) + hii(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t)) | G
(i)
t
]
≤ 0
for all t, i = 1, 2
and
E
[
∂fi
∂ξi
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), wˆ(t)) + λi(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t))pˆi(t) + hii(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t)) | G
(i)
t
]
dξˆi(t) = 0
for all t, i = 1, 2.
(5.43)
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Proof. This theorem can be proved in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2 with an
adjustment to the stochastic game case. The adjustment is similar to one in the proof of
Theorem 5.1. 
6 Applications
6.1 Return to the optimal harvesting problem
To illustrate our results, we apply it to the optimal harvesting problem (2.3),(2.4) in Section
2.1: Here the Hamiltonian (3.12) gets the form
H(t, x, y, ξ, p, q)(dt, dξ) = [yb(t)p+ xσ(t)q]dt + {−λ0(t)p+ xh0(t)}dξ(t) (6.1)
By Theorem 5.1 the corresponding BSDE reduces to{
dp(t) = −[b(t)p(t) + σ(t)q(t)]dt+ q(t)dB(t)
p(T ) = K
(6.2)
with associated variational inequalities{
−λ0(t)p(t) + h0(t)X(t) ≤ 0; t ∈ [0, T ]
[−λ0(t)p(t) + h0(t)X(t)]dξˆ(t) = 0; t ∈ [0, T ]
(6.3)
The system consisting of (2.3),(2.4) combined with (6.2),(6.3) represents a mean-field
forward-backward reflected SDE . Combining the above with the result of Section 4 we get:
Theorem 6.1 Assume that Xˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ξˆ(t) is a solution of the system (2.3),(2.4) &
(6.2),(6.3). Then ξˆ(t) is an optimal harvesting strategy for the problem (2.5). Heuristically
the optimal harvesting strategy can be described as follows:
• If
pˆ(t) >
h0(t)Xˆ(t)
λ0(t)
, i.e. Xˆ(t) <
λ0(t)pˆ(t)
h0(t)
, (6.4)
then do nothing (choose ξˆ(t) = 0).
• If
pˆ(t) =
h0(t)Xˆ(t)
λ0(t)
, i.e. Xˆ(t) =
λ0(t)pˆ(t)
h0(t)
, (6.5)
then we harvest immediately from Xˆ(t) at a rate dξˆ(t) which is exactly enough to pre-
vent Xˆ(t) from going above λ0(t)pˆ(t)
h0(t)
.
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• If
pˆ(0−) <
h0(0)Xˆ(0
−)
λ0(0)
, i.e. Xˆ(0−) >
λ0(0)pˆ(0
−)
h0(0)
, (6.6)
then we harvest immediately what is necessary to bring Xˆ(0) down to the the level of
λ0(0)pˆ(0
h0(0)
.
6.2 Application to model uncertainty singular control
We represent model uncertainty by a family of probability measures Q = Qθ equivalent to
P , with the Radon-Nikodym derivative on Ft given by
d(Q | Ft)
d(P | Ft)
= Gθ(t) (6.7)
where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Gθ(t) is an exponential martingale of the form
dGθ(t) = Gθ(t−)θ(t)dB(t); Gθ(0) = 1. (6.8)
Here θ may be regarded as a scenario control. Let A1 := AG denote a given family of
admissible singular controls ξ and let A2 := Θ denote a given set of admissible scenario
controls θ such that
E[
∫ T
0
θ2(t)dt] <∞. (6.9)
Now assume that X1(t) = X
ξ(t) is a singularly controlled mean-field Itoˆ process of the
form
dX1(t) = b1(t, X1(t), Y1(t), ω)dt+ σ1(t, X1(t), Y1(t), ω)dB(t)
+ λ1(t, X1(t), ω)dξ(t), (6.10)
where
Y1(t) = F (X1(t, ·)), (6.11)
and F is a Fre´chet differentiable operator on L2(P ).
As before let G(1) = {G
(1)
t }0≤t≤T and G
(2) = {G
(2)
t }0≤t≤T be given subfiltrations of F =
{Ft}0≤t≤T , representing the information available to the controllers at time t. It is required
that ξ ∈ A1 be G
(1)-predictable, and θ ∈ A2 be G
(2)-predictable. We set w = (ξ, θ) and
consider the stochastic differential game to find (ξˆ, θˆ) ∈ A1 ×A2 such that
sup
ξ∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
EQθ [j(ξ, θ)] = EQθˆ [j(ξˆ, θˆ)] = infθ∈A2
sup
ξ∈A1
EQθ [j(ξ, θ)], (6.12)
where
j(ξ, θ) =
∫ T
0
{f1(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), ω) + ρ(θ(t))}dt
+ g1(X(T ), Y (T ), ω) +
∫ T
0
h1(t, X(t), ω)ξ(dt). (6.13)
28
The term EQθ [
∫ T
0
ρ(θ(t))dt] can be seen as a penalty term, penalizing the difference
between Qθ and the original probability measure P .
Note that since Gθ(t) is a martingale we have
EQθ [j(ξ, θ)] = E
[
Gθ(T )g1(X(T ), Y (T )) +
∫ T
0
Gθ(t){f1(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))) + ρ(θ(t))}dt
+
∫ T
0
Gθ(t)h1(t, X(t), Y (t))ξ(dt)
]
=: J(ξ, θ). (6.14)
We see that this is a mean-field singular control stochastic differential game of the type
discussed in Section 4, with a two-dimensional state space
X(t) := (X1(t), X2(t)) := (X
ξ(t), Gθ(t)) (6.15)
and with
f(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ, θ)) := Gθ(t){f1(t, X1(t), Y1(t), ξ(t)) + ρ(θ(t))}
= X2(t){f1(t, X1(t), Y1(t), ξ(t)) + ρ(θ(t))}, (6.16)
g(X(T ), Y (T )) := Gθ(T )g1(X1(T ), Y1(T )) = X2(T )g1(X1(T ), Y1(T )), (6.17)
and
h(t, X(t), Y (t)) := Gθ(t)h1(t, X1(t), Y1(t)) = X2(t)h1(t, X1(t), Y1(t)). (6.18)
Using the result from Section 4, we get the following Hamiltonian for the game (6.12):
H(t, x1, x2, y1, ξ, θ, p, q, r)(dt, ξ(dt))
= H0(t, x1, x2, y1, ξ, θ, p, q)dt+ {λ1(t, x)p1 + x2h1(t, x)}ξ(dt) (6.19)
where
H0(t, x1, x2, y1, ξ, θ, p, q) = x2{f1(t, x1, y1, ξ) + ρ(θ)}
+ b1(t, x1, y1)p1 + σ(t, x1, y1)q1 + x2θq2. (6.20)
The corresponding mean-field BSDEs for the adjoint processes become

dp1(t) = −
∂H0
∂x1
(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), p(t), q(t))dt
−
∂H0
∂y1
(t, X(t), Y (t), w(t), p(t), q(t))∇X1(t)F )dt+ q1(t)dB(t)
p1(T ) = X2(T )
∂g1
∂x1
(X1(T ), Y1(T )) + E[
∂g1
∂y1
(X1(T ), Y1(T ))]∇X1(T )F
(6.21)
and {
dp2(t) = −{f1(t, X1(t), Y1(t), ξ) + ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)q2(t)}dt+ q2(t)dB(t)
p2(T ) = g1(X1(T ), Y1(T )).
(6.22)
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Minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to θ gives the following first order condition:
∂ρ
∂θ0
(t) = −E[q2(t) | G
(2)
t ]. (6.23)
The variational inequalities (5.14) - (5.15) reduce to{
E[∇ξf1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), wˆ(t)) + λ1(t, Xˆ1(t))pˆ(t) + h1(t, Xˆ1(t)) | E
(1)
t ] ≤ 0;
E[∇ξf1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), wˆ(t)) + λ1(t, Xˆ(t))pˆ(t) + h1(t, Xˆ(t)) | E
(1)
t ]dξˆ(t) = 0;
(6.24)
6.3 A special case
For simplicity, consider the special case with
G
(i)
t = Ft, (6.25)
and
λ1(t, x) = λ1(t), h1(t, x) = h1(t) (6.26)
i.e., λ1 and h1 do not depend on x.
Then, writing X1(t) = X
ξ(t), Y1(t) = Y
ξ(t) and X2(t) = G
θ(t) and f1 = f, g1 = g, b1 =
b, σ1 = σ, λ1 = λ, the controlled system gets the form (X
ξ, Gθ), where Gθ is given by (6.8)
and
dXξ(t) = b(t, Xξ(t), Y ξ(t))dt+ σ(t, Xξ(t), Y ξ(t))dB(t) + λ(t)dξ(t); Xξ(0) = x (6.27)
The performance functional becomes
EQθ [j(ξ, θ)] = E
[
Gθ(T )g(Xξ(T ), Y ξ(T ))
+
∫ T
0
Gθ(t){f(t, Xξ(t), Y ξ(t), ξ(t)) + ρ(θ(t))}dt] =: J(ξ, θ). (6.28)
and the Hamiltonian becomes
H(t, x, g, y, ξ, θ, p, q)(dt, ξ(dt))
= H0(t, x, g, y, ξ, θ, p, q)dt+ {λ(t)p1 + gh1(t)}ξ(dt), (6.29)
where
H0(t, x, g, y, ξ, θ, p, q) = g{f1(t, x, y, ξ) + ρ(θ)} + b1(t, x, y)p1 + σ(t, x, y)q1 + gθq2.
The corresponding mean-field BSDEs for the adjoint processes become

dp1(t) = −
∂H0
∂x
(t, Xξ(t), Y ξ(t), ξ(t), p(t), q(t))dt
−
∂H0
∂y
(t, Xξ(t), Y ξ(t), ξ(t), p(t), q(t))∇Xξ(t)F )dt+ q1(t)dB(t)
p1(T ) = G
θ(T )
∂g
∂x
(Xξ(T ), Y ξ(T )) + E[
∂g
∂y
(Xξ(T ), Y ξ(T ))]∇Xξ(T )F
(6.30)
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and {
dp2(t) = −{f(t, X
ξ(t), Y ξ(t), ξ) + ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)q2(t)}dt+ q2(t)dB(t)
p2(T ) = g1(X
ξ(T ), Y ξ(T )).
(6.31)
Then the first order condition for a minimum of the Hamiltonian with respect to θ0
reduces to
ρ′(θ)(t) = −q2(t). (6.32)
The variational inequalities (6.19) become{
∇ξf1(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + λ1(t)p1(t) + h1(t) ≤ 0;
[∇ξf1(t, X1(t), Y1(t), ξ(t)) + λ1(t)p1(t) + h1(t)]dξ(t) = 0;
(6.33)
In general it seems to be a formidable mathematical challenge to solve such a coupled
system of forward-backward singular SDEs. However, in some cases a possible solution
procedure could be described, as in the next example:
6.4 Optimal harvesting under uncertainty
Now we consider a model uncertainty version of the optimal harvesting problem in Section
6.1. For simplicity we put K = 1. Thus we have the following mean-field forward system
(X,ξ , Gθ), where Gθ is given by (6.8) and{
dX(t) = dXξ(t) = E[Xξ(t)]b(t)dt +Xξ(t)σ(t)dB(t)− λ0(t)dξ(t)
Xξ(0−) = x > 0,
(6.34)
with performance functional
J(ξ, θ) = E[
∫ T
0
Gθ(t)ρ(θ(t))dt +
∫ T
0
Gθ(t)h0(t)X
ξ(t)dξ(t) +Gθ(T )Xξ(T )]. (6.35)
The model uncertainty harvesting problem is to find (ξ∗, θ∗) ∈ AF ×Θ such that
sup
ξ∈AF
{
inf
θ∈Θ
J(ξ, θ)
}
= inf
θ∈Θ
{
sup
ξ∈AF
J(ξ, θ)
}
= J(ξ∗, θ∗), (6.36)
Here the Hamiltonian is
H(t, x, g, y, ξ, θ, p, q)(dt, ξ(dt))
= {gρ(θ) + yb(t)p1 + xσ(t)q1 + gθq2}dt+ {−λ0(t)p1 + xgh0(t)}ξ(dt). (6.37)
Minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to θ gives the first order equation
ρ′(θ)(t) = −q2(t). (6.38)
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The corresponding reflected backward system is{
dp1(t) = −[b(t)p1(t) + σ(t)q1(t)]dt− h0(t)G
θ(t)dξ(t) + q1(t)dB(t)
p1(T ) = G
θ(T )
(6.39)
and {
dp2(t) = −[ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)q2(t)]dt− h0(t)X(t)dξ(t) + q2(t)dB(t)
p2(T ) = X(T ),
(6.40)
with variational inequalities {
−λ0(t)p1(t) + h1(t) ≤ 0;
[−λ0(t)p1(t) + h1(t)]dξ(t) = 0
(6.41)
Then we get the following result:
Theorem 6.2 Suppose there exists a solution Xˆ(t) := X ξˆ(t), Gˆ(t) := Gθˆ(t), pˆ1(t),qˆ1(t),pˆ2(t),qˆ2(t),ξˆ(t),θˆ(t)
of the coupled system of mean-field forward-backward singular stochastic differential equations
consisting of the forward equations (6.34) and the reflected backward equations (6.39),(6.40),
and satisfying the constraint (6.41). Then ξˆ(t) is the optimal harvesting strategy and θˆ(t) is
the optimal scenario parameter for the model uncertainty harvesting problem (6.36).
6.5 A mean field singular game
We now return to the mean field singular game described in Section 2.3.
In this case, we get from (5.6)
Hi(t, x, y, ξ1, ξ2, pi, qi)(dt, ξ1(dy), ξ2(dt))
= pimin(x, ξ1 + ξ2) + yb(t)pi + xσ(t)qi + h1ξ1(dt) + h2ξ2(dt)
and the adjoint equations (5.8) becomes{
dpi(t) = −
[
χ[0,ξ1+ξ2)(x)pi(t) + σ(t)qi(t) + b(t)pi(t)
]
dt+ qi(t)dB(t) ;
pi(T ) = 0 .
The variational inequalities (5.43) get the form

pi(t)χ[0,X(t))(ξ1(t) + ξ2(t)) + hi(t) ≤ 0
and[
pi(t)χ[0,X(t))(ξ1(t) + ξ2(t)) + hi(t)
]
ξi(dt) = 0 ; i = 1, 2 .
Optimal strategy for factory 1:
i) If pi(t) + h1(t) < 0, do nothing.
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ii) If pi(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 increase ξ1(t) to X(t)− ξ
∗
2(t).
In other words, (ξ1, X) solves the reflected Skorohod problem{
ξ1(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ
∗
2(t))χ[0,∞)(pi(t) + h1(t))[
ξ1(t)− (X(t)− ξ
∗
2(t))χ[0,∞)(pi(t) + h1(t))
]
ξ1(dt) = 0 .
(6.42)
So for given ξ∗2 we choose ξ1 := R1(ξ
∗
2) solution of the reflected Skorohod problem (6.42).
Similarly, given ξ∗1 we choose ξ2 := R2(ξ
∗
1) as the solution of the reflected Skorohod
problem {
ξ2(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ
∗
1(t))χ[0,∞)(pi(t) + h2(t))[
ξ2(t)− (X(t)− ξ
∗
1(t))χ[0,∞)(pi(t) + h2(t))
]
ξ2(dt) = 0 .
(6.43)
Thus, to find the Nash equilibrium we need to solve the following coupled reflected Skorohod
problem: 

ξ1(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ2(t))χ[0,∞)(pi(t) + h1(t))[
ξ1(t)− (X(t)− ξ2(t))χ[0,∞)(pi(t) + h1(t))
]
ξ1(dt) = 0 ;
ξ2(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ1(t))χ[0,∞)(pi(t) + h2(t))[
ξ2(t)− (X(t)− ξ1(t))χ[0,∞)(pi(t) + h2(t))
]
ξ2(dt) = 0 .
(6.44)
The above system of reflected Skorohod problem can be solved in the following way:
We divide the interval[0, T ] into 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T such that on each interval
[tk, tk+1) the signs of pi(t) + h1(t) and pi(t) + h2(t) remains unchanged.
On each interval [tk, tk+1], we use the following control principles. If both of the inequal-
ities pi(t) + h1(t) < 0 and pi(t) + h2(t) < 0 hold, then do nothing. If pi(t) + h1(t) < 0 and
pi(t) + h2(t) ≥ 0, then the first factory does not do anything. The second condition in (6.44)
becomes {
ξ2(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ1(t))
[ξ2(t)− (X(t)− ξ1(t)))] ξ2(dt) = 0 .
By Remark 2.7 (namely, Equation (2.8)) of [3],
ξ2(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
(X(s)− ξ1(tk))
+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
Thus, we keep ξ1(t) = ξ1(tk) unchanged and in the same time increase ξ2(t) to X(t)− ξ1(t).
Similar result holds if pi(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 and pi(t) + h2(t) < 0.
If both pi(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 and pi(t) + h2(t) ≥ 0, then (6.44) becomes

ξ1(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ2(t))
[ξ1(t)− (X(t)− ξ2(t))] ξ1(dt) = 0 ;
ξ2(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ1(t))
[ξ2(t)− (X(t)− ξ1(t)))] ξ2(dt) = 0 .
(6.45)
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Let ξ(t) = ξ1(t) + ξ2(t) and then (6.45) is equivalent to{
ξ(t) ≥ X(t)
[ξ(t)−X(t)] ξ(dt) = 0 .
Again by Remark 2.7 (namely, Equation (2.8)) of [3], we have
ξ(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
X(s)+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
Now we show that any decomposition of ξ(t) into the sum of two nondecreasing processes
ξ1(t) and ξ2(t) will solve (6.45). In fact, assume ξ(t) = ξ1(t) + ξ2(t), where ξ1 and ξ2 are two
nondecreasing processes. Since ξ(t) ≥ X(t) and ξ1 and ξ2 are nondecreasing, we have{
[ξ(t)−X(t)] ξ1(dt) ≥ 0
[ξ(t)−X(t)] ξ2(dt) ≥ 0 .
Add them we have
[ξ(t)−X(t)] ξ1(dt) + [ξ(t)−X(t)] ξ2(dt) = [ξ(t)−X(t)] ξ(dt) = 0 .
This implies {
[ξ(t)−X(t)] ξ1(dt) = 0
[ξ(t)−X(t)] ξ2(dt) = 0 .
Thus, ξ1 and ξ2 satisfies (6.45). Summarizing we have
Theorem 6.3 Assume that we can divide the interval [0, T ] into 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn =
T such that on each interval [tk, tk+1) the signs of pi(t) + h1(t) and pi(t) + h2(t) remain
unchanged. Then we can recursively find the solution ξ1 and ξ2 on each interval [tk, tk+1] for
k = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1. On the interval [tk, tk+1], we have
(i) If both of the inequalities pi(t) + h1(t) < 0 and pi(t) + h2(t) < 0 hold, then do nothing.
(ii) If pi(t) + h1(t) < 0 but pi(t) + h2(t) ≥ 0, then
ξ1(t) = ξ1(tk) , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1
and
ξ2(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
(X(s)− ξ1(tk))
+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
If pi(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 but pi(t) + h2(t) < 0, then
ξ2(t) = ξ2(tk) , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1
and
ξ1(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
(X(s)− ξ2(tk))
+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
(iii) If both of the inequalities pi(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 and pi(t) + h2(t) ≥ 0 hold, then ξ1 and ξ2
can be any nondecreasing processes such that
ξ1(t) + ξ2(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
X(s)+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
Note in particular that in this case the Nash equilibrium is not unique.
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